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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Robert Joseph Frauenberger appeals from the district court's judgment of 
conviction A jury convicted Mr. Frauenberger of three counts of lewd conduct and one 
count of delivery of marijuana to a person under the age of eighteen. The Third 
Amended Criminal Information listed Bonnie Noe as the alleged minor victim involved in 
each count However, no evidence at trial was presented concerning the alleged victim, 
thirteen year-old "Bonnie Noe." On appeal, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to 
provide substantial competent evidence to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Mr. Frauenberger engaged In inappropriate sexual contact with "Bonnie Noe" or 
provided her with marijuana. 
Alternatively, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the district court did not have 
jurisdiction to allow the jury to make findings on crimes related to B.H. as he had never 
been charged with said crimes. At trial, evidence was presented which showed that 
Mr. Frauenberger may have committed crimes, similar to those charged, involving 
another minor, B.H. Although the information charged Mr. Frauenberger with 
committing these crimes against "Bonnie Noe," the jury was instructed that it must find 
Mr. Frauenberger guilty if they believed he committed these crimes against B.H. 
Because Mr. Frauenberger had never been charged with committing lewd conduct 
against B.H. or providing marijuana to B.H., he asserts that the district court did not 
have jurisdiction to allow the jury to make a finding on Mr. Frauenberger's guilt as to 
those charges which had never been filed. 
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Alternatively, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the district court created an 
impermissible variance when it failed to limit the elements instruction for each of the 
charges to those overt acts alleged in the Information, specifically that the alleged victim 
was Bonnie Noe, not B.H. as the jury was instructed. 
Additionally, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the State committed prosecutorial 
misconduct which deprived him of a fair trial. The prosecution violated its duty to see 
that Mr. Frauenberger had a fair trial by engaging in vouching, presenting improper 
evidence, and appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury. Mr. Frauenberger 
contends that the misconduct committed in his case was either preserved by objection 
or constituted fundamental error and that the errors are not harmless. Moreover, 
Mr. Frauenberger asserts the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant his 
motion for a mistrial based upon prosecutorial misconduct. 
Further, Mr. Frauenberger contends the district court abused its discretion when 
it sentenced him to an excessive sentence without considering the mitigating factors 
that exist in his case. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's assertions that there was 
sufficient evidence to support Mr. Frauenberger's convictions, that the district court had 
jurisdiction over charges involving B.H., and that the variance in the case at hand is not 
fatal. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Frauenberger's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, 
but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to support the jury's verdicts 
finding Mr. Frauenberger guilty of lewd conduct or delivery of marijuana to 
Bonnie Noe? 
2. Were the charges for which Mr. Frauenberger was ultimately convicted, related 
to criminal conduct involving a minor victim B.H., charges for which no 
information or indictment had been filed and for which subject matter jurisdiction 
had not been conferred? 
3. Did the district court create a fatal variance from the State's information when it 
instructed the jury that the charges involved the minor victim B.H. instead of 
Bonnie Noe as alleged in the information? 
4. Did the State violate Mr. Frauenberger's right to a fair trial by committing 
prosecutorial misconduct? 
5. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon 
Mr. Frauenberger, unified sentences of ten years, with two years fixed, for the 
lewd conduct charges, and four years, with one year fixed, for the delivery of 
marijuana charge, to be served concurrently? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support The Jury's Verdicts 
Finding Mr. Frauenberger Guilty Of Lewd Conduct Or Delivery Of Marijuana To Bonnie 
Noe 
Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 
support his convictions for three counts of lewd conduct and one count of delivery of 
marijuana to a person under the age of eighteen because the State failed to provide 
substantial competent evidence to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Mr. Frauenberger engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with Bonnie Noe or provided 
her with marijuana as he was charged. 
The State has asserted that whether there was sufficient evidence "to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that B.H. and "Bonnie Noe" were the same person is 
irrelevant to a sufficiency of the evidence analysis ... because the name of the victim is 
not an element of any of the charged crimes. (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-14.) And, that 
"[n]either the lewd conduct statute nor the marijuana delivery statute require as an 
essential element proof of the victim's name." (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) 
However, "[aJ criminal defendant is entitled to be apprised by the charging 
instrument not only of the name of the offense charged but in general terms of the 
manner in which it is alleged to have been committed." State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 
331 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing I.C. §§ 19-1303, -1409 (charging instrument must contain a 
statement of the acts constituting the offense); I.C. § 19-1411 (charging instrument must 
be direct and certain as it regards the particular circumstances of the offense charged); 
State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 246-47 (1937) (holding that an information must not 
4 
only state the name of the alleged crime but also inform the accused as to how it is 
claimed the accused committed the offense.)). If a charging instrument must contain 
information which provides for particularity in the wayan offence was committed, the 
name of the alleged victim should be considered such vital information. In fact, Thurlow 
holds that an information should reflect the name of the prosecutrix as such data is an 
essential part of the charge against a defendant for lewd and lascivious conduct. 
State v. Thurlow, 85 Idaho 96, 103 (1962). While the formal name of an individual may 
not control and guide a sufficiently of the evidence review, the identity of the person 
alleged as a victim must. 
Mr. Frauenberger asserts that, in the case at hand, the name Bonnie Noe was 
presented in the charging document, providing the factual basis for his alleged criminal 
activity as is required to confer jurisdiction. See Issue II. Because the identity of the 
alleged victim is an essential part of the charge, as held in Thurlow, and because the 
State asserted specific factual data in the Information, the State was required to present 
substantial competent evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found 
that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt, including the identity of the alleged victim, Bonnie Noe. 
There was no evidence, much less substantial and competent evidence, presented that 
proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that B.H. was Bonnie Noe or that Mr. Frauenberger 
had any sexual contact or provided marijuana to Bonnie Noe. When the discrepancy 
between the charging instrument allegations and the proof at trial is that of an entirely 
different person, that discrepancy is not merely a variance, it is failure of proof. 
Because the State did not prove that B.H. was Bonnie Noe or that Mr. Frauenberger 
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had committed any offense against Bonnie Noe, proof of which was essential in order to 
establish the State's charges beyond a reasonable doubt, there was no evidence that 
would support a finding of guilt on any of the charges and the convictions must be 
overturned. 
II. 
The Charges For Which Mr. Frauenberger Was Ultimately Convicted, Related To 
Criminal Conduct Involving A Minor Victim B.H., Were Charges For Which No 
Information Or Indictment Had Been Filed And For Which Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Had Not Been Conferred 
The State asserted that, "Frauenberger's argument is without merit because it 
conflates the concepts of lack of jurisdiction, which may be raised for the first time on 
appeal, and lack of notice, any claim of which is waived if not raised as an issue before 
tria!." (Respondent's Brief, p.g.) However, Mr. Frauenberger has explicitly not raised a 
notice issue. 1 Instead, the State has attempted to reclassify the issue raised on appeal 
to an issue that could be decided in the State's favor as opposed to fully addressing the 
merits of the issue actually raised on appeal. 
Mr. Frauenberger was charged with three counts of lewd conduct and one count 
of delivery of marijuana to a minor, all charges specifically noting that Bonnie Noe was 
the alleged victim. Although the information charged Mr. Frauenberger with committing 
these crimes against Bonnie Noe, the jury was instructed that it must find 
Mr. Frauenberger guilty if they believed he had committed these crimes against B.H. 
1 Mr. Frauenberger does not raise a notice issue in this appeal. He concedes that a 
notice claim should have been raised prior to trial and is now waived. However, he 
maintains that a failure to raise a notice claim does not preclude review of any of the 
issues specifically addressed on appeal, as these issues are either preserved or 
amount to fundamental error. 
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The district court did not have jurisdiction to allow the jury to make a finding on 
Mr. Frauenberger's guilt as to charges that had never been filed. Mr. Frauenberger 
asserts that he had never been charged for crimes associated with an alleged victim 
named B.H. Therefore, there was no jurisdiction for the district court to instruct the jury 
on crimes related to B.H. 
As stated in the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Frauenberger does not challenge that the 
information is defective. He acknowledges that the information properly charged him 
with crimes related to the alleged victim Bonnie Noe. On appeal, the State asserts that 
H[t]here is no jurisdictional requirement that the charging document also use the victim's 
actual name," (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) In coming to this conclusion, the State 
acknowledged the seminal cases in Idaho related to jurisdiction: State v. Jones, 140 
Idaho 755 (2004) and State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619 (2005). Although Jones and 
Quintero do not stand for the proposition that an alleged victim must be named, other 
authority suggests that a victim must be named in order for information to be legally 
sufficient. See State v. Lenz, 103 Idaho 632, 633-34 (Ct. App. 1982) and I.C. § 19-
1409, The State erroneously asserted that the above authority is only relevant to a due 
process notice claim, an unsupported limitation. Additionally, the State, tellingly, failed 
to address State v, Thurlow, 85 Idaho 96, 103 (1962) (finding that an information should 
reflect the name of the prosecutrix as such data is an essential part of the charge 
against a defendant for lewd and lascivious conduct). Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the 
above authority requires that the State name an alleged victim in the information and 
prove that the named victim and the injured person, as presented at trial, can be 
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identified as one in the same, regardless of the actual name used. 2 In this case, the 
State chose to name Bonnie Noe as the alleged victim and, as such, the information 
only conferred jurisdiction for the district court to instruct on crimes related to Bonnie 
Noe or a person with the same identity. 
Alternatively, as asserted by the State, even if an alleged victim does not have to 
be named, if the State chooses to name an alleged victim, they may limit what 
otherwise might be very broad jurisdiction to jurisdiction only over conduct involving the 
named individual. Although admittedly not binding on this issue, Mr. Frauenberger 
asserts that cases holding that the offense charged is controlled by the facts alleged in 
an information are persuasive to show that specified factual information limits authority. 
See State v. Mickey, 27 Idaho 626 (1915) (holding that involuntary manslaughter was 
charged in the information although the information designated the offense as 
manslaughter because the specific facts stated in the information alleged all the facts 
constituting involuntary manslaughter); State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808 (1967) 
(holding that where the caption of the complaint and information charged aggravated 
assault, but the charging language "clearly indicated an aggravated battery" the 
amendment of the information was proper because it was "merely to correct the caption 
to properly designate the offense unmistakably charged in the charging part of the 
information."); and State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244 (1990) (holding the "facts alleged 
rather than the designation of the offense" controls. As such, it was not necessary to 
2 Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the use of a minor, alleged victim's true initials is 
sufficient to provide the "name" of the alleged victim in order to confer jurisdiction; 
however, the use of a pseudonym is likely insufficient, especially where information is 
not provided stating clearly that such name is a pseudonym. 
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have provided O'Neill with a new preliminary hearing because the acts alleged in the 
Amended Information were the same acts charged in the original Information and those 
facts controlled which crime was actually charged.). Because the facts alleged control 
which offense is actually charged, regardless of the designation of the offense charged, 
the facts also necessarily provide a limit as to the specific offense or specific criminal 
activities for which a defendant can be tried. 
In this case, there is not an information charging Mr. Frauenberger with any 
criminal actions involving B.H., nor specific facts alleged to show that he was charged 
with criminal actions Involving B.H. as apposed to the named alleged victim, Bonnie 
Noe. Therefore, the information filed conferred jurisdiction only for the crimes charged 
involving Bonnie Noe. Because there was no jurisdiction for the district court to allow 
the jury to make a determination as to Mr. Frauenberger's potential guilt associated with 
his possible actions involving B.H., he asserts that his convictions must be vacated. 
III. 
The District Court Created A Fatal Variance From The State's Information When It 
Instructed The Jury That The Charges Involved The Minor Victim B.H., Instead Of 
Bonnie Noe As Alleged In The Information 
The State has asserted that the variance in this case is not fatal and does not 
rise to the level of fundamental error. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-25.) However, 
Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the variance is fatal because it leaves him open to the 
risk of being prosecuted for suspected crimes involving B.H. Mr. Frauenberger does not 
assert that the variance in his case implicates concerns of fair notice, but only that it has 
double jeopardy implications. 
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In the case at hand, Mr. Frauenberger was charged with crimes associated with 
the named victim Bonnie Noe; however, the evidence presented at trial was that he may 
have engaged in criminal activities involving B.H. and the jury was instructed using the 
name B.H. instead of the charged name Bonnie Noe. (R., pp.18-21, 80-105; 
Augmentation, Jury Instruction Number 10.) The State has asserted that this mere 
variance is not of constitutional significance because Bonnie Noe is just an obvious 
pseudonym. (Respondent's Brief, pp.17 -23.) In support of this argument, it relies 
heavily on a line of cases originating out of Texas. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.17-20 
(citing Stevens v. State, 891 SW.2d 649, 650-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) Washington v. 
State, 59 S.W.3d 260, 263-64 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001)) However, it is important to note 
that these cases have limited relevance due to Texas' enactment of a specific article of 
their criminal code dealing with a victim's right to chose a pseudonym and how such 
pseudonym is to be used in criminal case, including the filing of a pseudonym form 
which must be turned into law enforcement and provides for disclosure of the name to 
the defense or use at trial if identity is an issue. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 57.02. 
The State also relies on Monfort v. State, 635 S.E.2d 336, 337-38 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2006). The section specifically quoted by the State is actually taken from a quote in the 
Monfort opinion citing to Harrison v. State, 385 S.E.2d 774 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). 
Interestingly, Harrison dealt with va between the indictment and the proof 
ind a robbery of Phil Stephenson, the owner of the service 
station where a robbery occurred, whereas the evidence established that the victim had 
been Randy Hicks, an employee of the service station. Id. The Georgia Court of 
Appeals specifically found 
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In cases such as the present one, where a variance exists between 
the victim's name as alleged in the indictment and as proven at trial, it has 
generally been held that the variance is not fatal if the two names in fact 
refer to the same individual, such as where a mere misnomer is involved 
or where the variance is attributable to the use of a nickname or alias by 
the victim .. 
It is apparent without dispute from the evidence in the present case 
that the person identified as the victim in the indictment was not in fact the 
person against whom the robbery was committed, and the state has 
suggested no reason why this error could not have been corrected prior to 
trial. Being aware of no decision from any state or federal appellate court 
in the nation upholding a conviction of a crime of personal violence under 
such circumstances, we hold that the variance was fatal and that the trial 
court consequently erred in denying the appellant's motion for new trial. 
Id. at 775-76. 
The case at hand is not one involving a statutorily allowed victim's choice of 
pseudonym, a nickname, an alias, or a mere misnomer and, therefore, the cases cited 
by the State provide little insight into the issue presented on appeal. 
Mr. Frauenberger concedes that not all variances regarding the name on the 
charging document and the evidence at trial are fatal. Some variances, such as those 
involving a nickname, alias, or obvious pseudonym, may present no constitutional 
problem if the defendant is provided notice and the jury is able to determine that the 
individuals are the same person regardless of how the State named the alleged victim. 
However, that is not what occurred in the case at hand. 
The State's assertion that Bonnie Noe was a pseudonym for B.H., is not bore out 
by the record. In this case, the State did not present any evidence that Bonnie Noe and 
B.H. were the same individual. (See generally Tr. Tria/.) The name Bonnie Noe shares 
no obvious similarities to B.H.'s actual name. And, Bonnie Noe is not a recognized 
pseudonym like John or Jane Doe. 
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While some variances make no difference at all, some make all the difference in 
the world. Suppose, for example, the information alleged that the defendant killed 
Robert Smith. At the trial, the State proves that the defendant killed Julie Hart. That is 
a huge mistake. Murder maybe murder, but killing one person is not the same offense 
as killing an entirely different person. The Hoppet v. United States, 11 U. 
(181 a man shall charged 
IS 
IS 
the crime which is to 
will j the to "); see 
Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105 (1979) CA variance arises when the evidence 
d in an indictment') A 
variance of this type is actually a failure of proof because the charging document 
alleges one distinct offense, but the proof shows an entirely different offense. See Issue 
I. 
As eloquently noted recently by the Texas Court of Appeals in ultimately 
reversing and entering a judgment of acquittal in a theft case involving an improperly 
named victim of theft: 
But is the State correct? "What's in a name? That which we call a rose/By 
any other name would smell as sweet." No matter what we call it, this 
flower is still a rose. But a rose does not smell like a pickle. Are roses and 
pickles interchangeable? Is the evidence legally sufficient under [federal 
and Texas law] if everyone knew that it was really Wal-Mart who owned 
the stolen property, so it just did not matter who was alleged as the owner 
in the information and jury charge? The information could have alleged 
"Simon Legree," "Carnac the Magnificent," or "Macy's" for all we care, 
because it was undisputed at trial that Wal-Mart owned the property. No. 
12 
The parties, the court, and the jury must know the identity of the owner, 
regardless of how the State names him. 
Byrd v. State, 336 S.W.3d 242, 253-54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (internal citations 
omitted). 
In the case at hand, the State failed to prove that Bonnie Noe and B.H. were the 
same individual. In fact, the State made no attempt at all to prove to the jury that the 
two were the same individual. As such, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that they are not the 
same individuals. As a result, he asserts that the crimes for which he was charged, 
involving alleged victim Bonnie Noe, are not uniquely similarly to the evidence 
presented involving B.H. and therefore there is a danger that he could be later charged 
with crimes against B.H. As such, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that because the district 
court created a variance and thereby violated his right to due process, leaving him open 
to the risk of double jeopardy, and because he meets all three prongs of Idaho's 
fundamental error test, Mr. Frauenberger's conviction must be vacated. 
IV. 
The State Violated Mr. Frauenberger's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Because the State's argument concerning prosecutorial misconduct is not 
remarkable, no further reply is necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Frauenberger simply refers 
the Court back to pages 20-38 of his Appellant's Brief. 
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v. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Frauenberger, 
Unified Sentences Of Ten Years, With Two Years Fixed, For The Lewd Conduct 
Charges, And Four Years, With One Year Fixed, For The Delivery Of Marijuana Charge, 
To Be Served Concurrently 
Because the State's argument concerning the excessiveness of 
Mr. Frauenberger's sentence is not remarkable, no further reply is necessary. 
Accordingly, Mr. Frauenberger simply refers the Court back to pages 39-42 of his 
Appellant's Brief 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Frauenberger respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and 
remand his case for further proceedings. Alternatively, he requests that this Court 
reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 1ih day of October, 2012. 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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